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ABSTRACT
Despite the extensive privatization achievements over the last decades, 
government ownership of publicly traded companies remains pervasive 
around the world. Consistent with past evidence of structural change 
in the beta coefficient during financial crises, the more recent economic 
recession of 2014 to 2016 in Brazil presents an opportunity to demonstrate 
the disadvantages of allocating investment in companies that are publicly 
traded, but are controlled by the government. Constructing a portfolio of 
publicly traded State Owned Enterprises, we find that the financial crisis 
produced a significant increase in risk exposure, results that were much more 
pronounced when compared with a portfolio of privatized companies. The 
results also indicate that, in addition to a market factor, the poor performance 
can be explained by controllership. We believe this study adds to the long-
standing debate on whether state-owned firms perform worse than private 
firms, with higher volatility and lower returns, particularly, during a period 
of financial crisis.
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Despite the extensive privatization achievements over the last decades, government ownership 
of publicly traded companies remains pervasive around the world and, according to Boubakri et al. 
(2018), it accounts for nearly one-fifth of the world’s stock market capitalization. The economic 
policy of privatization is an important element leading the increase in the use of markets to better 
allocate resources, reducing the influence of the government over business activity. The latest rise 
in state capitalism has emerged following the rapid economic growth of China and the bailouts 
needed as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. This has revived the debate about government 
ownership of publicly traded firms and the extent to which such involvement in the economy is 
beneficial (Megginson, 2017; Vining e Weimer, 2016; D’Souza & Nash, 2017).
In Brazil, the combined market capitalization of state-owned companies represents close to 
20% of the Brazilian equity market (B3), a relevant portion for any investor interested in asset 
allocation in the country. These state-owned enterprises are diversely distributed in key sectors, 
including commodities, utilities, and financial services. Analyzing the risk of an State-Owned 
Enterprise portfolio in Brazil is of particular importance for investors considering the strategic 
relevance to the stock market. Nonetheless, considering the past evidence of structural change 
in the beta coefficient in historical financial crises, the more recent economic recession of 2014 
to 2016 presents an opportunity to further study such events. The aim of this study is then to 
evaluate the risk performance of Brazilian state-owned enterprises (SOEs), specifically during a 
market downturn and evaluate the need of an additional risk premium factor related to ownership. 
According to Dinç and Gupta (2011), as controller of a firm, the government exercises 
interference to pursue other objectives rather than profit maximization. Our study shows this 
is more apparent during an economic crisis. Even partial privatizations, where state-owned 
companies are publicly listed with stock in the hands of minority private investors, can suffer 
from these distorted objectives, as only the transfer of management control to private shareholders 
can address the inefficiency in an SOE (Gupta, 2005). Lazzarini and Musachio (2018) studied 
state ownership in various forms of SOEs that are publicly listed and found that, particularly in 
economic downturns, state-controlled firms appear to be less responsive than private firms to 
negative shocks that require adjustments. Although stock markets can provide the right incentives 
towards value maximization, such as the need to disclose information and the constant monitoring 
by investors, the evidence of poor performance and higher stock price volatility corroborates 
the belief that the political interference exercised by the state control is exacerbated during an 
economic downturn (Borisova et al., 2015; Vining & Weimer, 2016).
Investing in stocks implies risk, which can be measured by volatility of returns. In a recent 
study by Fama and French (2018), the average monthly risk premium of 0.51% in the US stock 
market had a volatility, measured by the standard deviation of 4.42%, almost nine times larger, 
which creates substantial uncertainty about future realized premiums. Further, although the high 
volatility of stocks is common knowledge, Fama and French pointed out that many professional 
investors seem unaware of the implications of this. We discovered in our research of SOE stock 
returns that negative equity premiums can last almost 10 years. The negative premium combined 
with a higher than estimated beta can have a significant impact for investment management and 
asset allocation decisions. 
As systematic risk relates to random market volatility, our study conducted empirical analysis of 
the possible existence of a changing relationship between the beta and the market risk premium 
during a complete economic cycle of boom and bust for a portfolio of state-controlled companies, 
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and compared and contrasted this with a portfolio of privatized companies. Using a single factor 
as well as a multifactor model, we analyzed the performance of the portfolios from 2008 to 2016. 
In light of the evidence of the impact of a financial crisis on the stability of betas, we examined 
the issue in terms of risk increase, particularly during the severe phase of a financial crisis that 
coincided with an economic recession. An adequate estimation of the risk factor has important 
implications for risk management and portfolio allocation. The impact of the economic crisis of 
2014 to 2016 on the evolution of the beta is also relevant in helping us understand the lack of 
stability of the single-factor capital asset pricing model (CAPM) during a financial crisis.
We observed that during an economic crisis, such as the recession period of 2014 to 2016 
in Brazil, the SOE stock price fluctuation increased, resulting in much higher risk than during 
a normal economic cycle. This increase in risk reflects that market agents expect government-
controlled companies to be less efficient and unable to reduce costs and adapt to an economic 
downturn compared with similar companies that are privately owned or have been privatized. 
We conclude that the financial crisis produced by an economic recession resulted in a structural 
change in the relationship between the SOE portfolio and the market, with a significant increase 
in risk exposure in addition to a negative market risk premium, results that were much more 
pronounced when compared with the privatized portfolio. The results also indicate that, in addition 
to a market factor, the poor performance can be explained by controllership. We believe this study 
contributes to the long-standing debate on whether state-owned firms perform worse than private 
firms, with higher volatility and lower returns, particularly during a period of financial crisis.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. SOE PErfOrmancE 
There is an extensive body of literature on the inefficiencies of SOEs (e.g., Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Meggison & Netter, 2001; Gupta, 2005; Dinç & 
Gupta, 2011 ; La Porta et al, 2002). However, despite significant privatization efforts over more 
than three decades, the last few years have brought a new wave of state capitalism. Lazzarini 
and Musachio (2018) investigated why, with so much evidence documenting the performance 
inferiority of state-controlled companies, there are still a large number of SOEs as well as resistance 
to privatization. Among the top 100 firms ranked by Fortune 500 in 2013, 25 were SOEs. 
Considering the resilience of the SOEs, Lazarini and Musachio studied the performance of 
477 large SOEs in 66 countries between 1997 and 2012, and with matching techniques selected 
431 privately controlled companies for a comparison. The authors concluded that regarding 
state capitalism, the key question was not whether SOEs underperformed private companies, 
but when and where. They found that SOEs underperformed their private peers during times of 
economic downturns, as they tended to be less efficient at cutting costs and adjusting to shocks. 
In addition, they concluded that the government’s negative influence on SOEs was higher in 
countries with weaker local institutions wich are unable to constrain political interference. Thus, 
the differences were not static but varied depending on the likelihood of government intervention 
and the temptations to intervene. The Brazilian recession of 2014-16 thus presents an opportunity 




2.2. caPm, fama-frEnch mOdEl, and EmPirical EvidEncE in Brazil 
The CAPM built on Markowitz’s (1959) mean-variance portfolio model and developed by 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972), remains the basis of modern financial economics 
despite the many important empirical challenges to the model’s strength over the years. It is 
widely used in academic research and practical security analysis and portfolio management, even 
as criticism has continued. The CAPM is a model that links the market risk that all companies 
are subjected to and the expected return of a given security or portfolio.
Based on the CAPM methodology, Black (1972) derived the market model, with the purpose 
to develop an alternative, more economical method to conduct conditional beta tests. While the 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) model is stated in terms of expectations, the 
empirical applications entail the use of historical data. Specifically, we base ex ante expectations 
on ex post observations. The market model embodies the same conditional relation among the 
variables: realized beta of market excess returns and realized excess portfolio return. The market 
model can be stated as:
rpt = αp + βp (rmt – rf) + εpt
where 
rpt = the excess-return on portfolio p
rmt = the excess-return on the market portfolio
rf = the risk-free rate
βp = the portfolio’s beta
αp = a fixed term for a given portfolio p 
εpt = error term
The CAPM has received a lot of criticism through the years. Some refer to the lack of 
efficiency and comprehensiveness of the beta and suggest the need for additional explanations. 
For instance, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) argued in favor of measuring systematic responsiveness 
to macroeconomic variables. Other researchers, such as Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), found 
empirical evidence that security returns were affected by measures of unsystematic risk.
Fama and French (1992) asserted that empirical evidence indicates the absence of a systematic 
relationship between the beta and security returns implying that beta does not fully measure risk. 
The three-factor model, or the Fama French model, expands on the CAPM by adding size risk 
and value risk factors to the market risk factor. The inclusion of two additional factors is believed 
to make the model a more robust tool for evaluating a portfolio performance.
Other researchers have confirmed the usefulness of the CAPM in many instances. Through 
empirical tests, Pettengill et al. (1995) found support for the market model using average realized 
returns as a proxy for expected returns and an index of equity security returns as a proxy for the 
market. However, the implicit assumption that expected excess market-returns should be positive 
was questioned when, in fact, realized excess market returns are negative, especially during a crisis 
or a recession. When realized market returns fall below the risk-free rate, an inverse relationship 
is predicted between realized returns and beta. Pettengill et al. (1995) suggested a model that 
allowed tests of beta that are conditioned on excess market return by separately investigating the 
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effect of beta on portfolio returns when realized excess market returns are negative and when 
realized excess market returns are positive. Beta may change as the return interval changes, as we 
will observe in the results of this study. 
Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge (1988) analyzed the autoregressive model of conditional 
duration and observed variation in the estimates for beta for various sub-periods, concluding 
that beta may vary over time. Slimane, Bellalah, and Rjiba (2017) studied the impact of the 
global financial crisis of 2008 with their results indicating that a rise in beta due to high volatility 
returns, in some cases, had a direct impact on beta systematic risk. This increase in beta could 
be an important component in investors’ portfolio decisions.
Despite the evidence in favor or against the market model, academics and market professionals 
still think about risk in terms of market price volatility. We assume that the preference for beta 
comes from the convenience of using a single factor to measure risk and its intuitive appeal. 
Thus, the use of beta may be justified as a measure of risk, even if beta in certain instances may 
be less efficient than alternative measures of systematic risk or is an incomplete measure of risk.
The literature on the CAPM for the Brazilian stock market (B3) is mixed with previous studies 
including validation and improvements in the application of the asset-pricing model. Sanvicente 
(2017) tested the use of a local CAPM, analyzing Brazilian market data, including stock returns 
and the risk-free rate and concluded that the model was also valid in Brazil, even without the 
use of an additional country risk premium due to the integration with global markets. The 
performance of the Brazilian market portfolio already incorporated the country risk.
Rogers and Securato (2009) studied the single-factor CAPM in addition to the three-factor 
model from Fama and French in the Brazilian market from 1996 to 2000. They concluded that 
the multifactor model was superior, but not including the specific high minus low (HML) value 
factor.
In a study by Noda, Martelanc, and Kayo (2015), the risk factor price-to-earnings ratio was also 
included in the traditional CAPM. The results from the study from 1995 to 2014 indicated that 
the price-to-earnings ratio was a complementary factor to the CAPM beta effect after controlling 
other components of the Fama and French model.
Silva, Pinto and Melo (2012) compared the traditional CAPM and the conditional form with 
the purpose of analyzing its predictive power and the presence of structural change over time 
for stock portfolios represented by Bovespa sectorial indices. They concluded that although the 
coefficient beta was statistically significant in the regressions, they found significant differences 
in the systematic risk in the sub-periods. 
In a more recent study, Bortoluzzo et al. (2016) analyzed the single-factor CAPM and the three-
factor Fama and French model during the 2008 crisis. The results from time series regressions 
with Brazilian stock portfolios indicated that the market risk factor was the most important for 
explaining portfolio returns, but not the only statistically significant factor. They also found 
differences in the risk premium by breaking the analyzed period into sub periods, including the 




2.3. POrtfOliO riSk during financial criSiS
Lo (2012) analyzed the behavior of investors during a financial crisis to address some of the 
criticism resulting from the use of traditional models that rely on assumptions such as the positive 
tradeoff between risk and reward across all financial investments; namely, that assets with higher 
risk offer higher expected returns and that this trade-off is linear as risk is best measured by equity 
“beta” and excess returns by “alpha,” the average deviation of a portfolio’s return from the CAPM 
benchmark. Lo (2012) pointed out that not only was that relationship not linear, but that asset 
returns were not stationary, and investors also behaved irrationally. Although he argued in favor 
of an adaptive market hypothesis, as investors learned from past crises, particularly dues to large-
scale economic changes, financial market dynamics can change. 
Page and Panariello (2018) also documented asset pricing during a financial crisis, showing 
that the reduction of risk through portfolio diversification tended to fail during a period of crisis, 
as the correlation changed in times of acute risk aversion. Financial markets tended to fluctuate 
between a low-volatility state and a panic-driven, high-volatility one. In addition, investor 
sentiment was a major factor as during a crisis, as opposed to a normal market, investors often 
sold riskier assets irrespective of differences in fundamentals. 
Marsh and Pfleiderer (2013) studied market dislocation during a financial crisis and concluded 
that when investors suffer losses and diversification can no longer reduce risk, the natural inclination 
is a flight to quality. This can produce increased volatility in riskier assets.
Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2017) studied the behavior of stocks during the global financial crisis 
of 2008 and the differences in performance and volatility. Considering the measure of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), they found that firms with higher CSR significantly outperformed 
firms with lower CSR. This conclusion was a reflection of the social capital built up, in this case 
based on CSR activities, which proved to be relevant when the importance of trust increased 
unexpectedly such as during the 2008 financial crisis. In Lins et al.’s conclusion, the enhanced 
performance of the higher CSR companies correlated with higher profitability, sales growth, and 
employee productivity relative to lower CSR companies, as well to the characteristics of state-
owned entities as a result of their political interference. 
Beuselinck (2017) studied the relation between government ownership and the value of European 
firms during the global financial crisis of 2008 and found that SOEs were less volatile during 
the crisis as state controllership was perceived as positive in weathering the storm. However, this 
was true only in countries with strong investor protection and high-level governance institutions 
rather than in developing countries with higher rates of corruption. The study concluded that 
the government can help stabilize a firm’s cost of debt with implicit and explicit government 
guarantees to alleviate financial supply shocks.
Boubakri et al. (2018) analyzed listed SOEs to answer the question of whether governments 
influence the valuations of publicly traded firms. Specifically, they investigated whether the 
relationship between government ownership and corporate valuation was influenced by the quality 
of the institutions and the government in place. Examining a large sample of companies in Asia 
from 2006 to 2010, they argued that market valuation was relevant because it represented investor 
expectations of future cash flows, a different view from accounting standards for efficiency. The 




In this study, we used the CAPM and Fama-French models to analyze the return on a portfolio 
of all government-controlled companies listed in the Brazilian stock market and compared the 
results with the performance of a portfolio of companies previously privatized. Since its inception 
in the 1960s, the CAPM has been a dominating capital market equilibrium model, and it is 
still widely used in academic research and practical portfolio management. However, our study 
shows that the portfolio beta is an incomplete measure of risk, particularly during a financial 
crisis. The choice of the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) is often due to its simplicity and 
relevance for the analysis of non-systematic risk in stock portfolios. As the single-factor model 
has been criticized often, we also tested the results using the three-factor Fama-French model. 
Although the SOE risk could be partially explained by the market beta, it was not stable enough 
to explain the investment return during the period including the financial crisis. We conclude 
that there is clear evidence of the appropriateness of the use of the CAPM model to analyze risk 
in the Brazilian market, given its simplicity and empirical results over time. We acknowledge the 
existing critics, particularly those who advocate for the inclusion of additional factors to enhance 
the model, which we will discuss in our conclusion.
3.1. thE SOE POrtfOliO 
Currently, there are a total of 23 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange B3 that 
are controlled by the government in Brazil. The definition of control for any listed corporation, 
financial and non-financial, is determined by voting shares of 50% or more owned by the 
government, either at the federal or state level. We collected monthly stock prices for the 23 
companies for the period 2008 to 2016 from Bloomberg. All 23 companies were included in our 
SOE portfolio using the market weight of each stock, with a maximum allocation of 20% for 
any individual stock, following the rules used by B3 for sector portfolio indices. Government-
controlled companies that went public and listed their stocks during the analyzed period were 
also included in the portfolio in the month of their initial public offering (IPO) in the proportion 
of their market weight. The list of all companies is in Appendix A.
The portfolio was rebalanced every quarter, and we matched the rebalance procedure of the 
B3 indices. The period chosen, from 2008 to 2016, represents one economic cycle, beginning 
with the recovery period after the 2008 crisis through the end of the last crisis in 2016.
3.2. thE PrivatizEd POrtfOliO 
Among all companies listed in the Brazilian stock market, B3, there are 22 that were previously 
government controlled and were privatized. A privatized company is defined as a company or a 
service concession that was once state owned and then auctioned to private shareholders. Most 
relevant privatizations in Brazil occurred in the 1990s including steel and mining companies, 
telecommunication, electric generation, transmission and distribution companies. We also included 
firms that were formed after acquiring new concessions to manage toll roads and railways, and in 
the electricity and telecom sectors that were auctioned during the 2000s. The same procedures 
for the SOE portfolio were replicated for the privatized one. 
Although we understand that a matching technique for selecting the privately-owned portfolio 
for comparison purposes is preferred, the size of the Brazilian market presents a constraint for 
such an approach. However, it is worth noting that our privatized portfolio had a similar sector 
allocation as the SOE portfolio, including utilities, commodities, and financial services. A list 




3.3. markEt POrtfOliO and riSk frEE ratE and riSk factOrS
As a proxy for the market portfolio, we used the IBX index, which represents the 100 largest 
companies by market cap listed on B3. Although IBOVESPA is a more popular market index in 
Brazil, it went through methodology changes during the period under analysis, while the IBX did 
not. After the changes, the two indices have become very similar, and the observed correlation 
in the last 36 months is over 99%. 
The risk-free rate we used was the monthly CDI, the Brazilian interbank deposit rate, and 
the most common benchmark in Brazil for security returns. All rates used were nominal in local 
currency. For the multifactor model, we used Nefin’s database (http://www.nefin.com.br) for 
the factors small minus big (SMB) and high minus low (HML).
The models were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The robustness of the model 
was tested using t statistics and Shapiro tests. The comparison of the means and variances were 
also tested using t statistics, the F test, and the Kruskal and Wallis test. We tested the regression 
for structural changes with the Chow test.
3.4. thE SuB-PEriOd Of analySiS
We were most interested in analyzing the crisis of 2014 to 2016, which represented the most 
severe economic recession in Brazil since 1930. The crisis period was defined by the maximum 
drawdown in the stock market, which occurred between September 2014 and February 2016. 
We included in the analysis the pre-crisis period of 2008 to 2014, forming a database of an entire 
economic cycle, comprising a recovery period, a boom, and a bust. The following period between 
2016 and 2018 represented the start of a new recovery phase marked by a change in government 
and economic policy, marked by news of a fresh privatization program.
4. RESULTS
The first stage of our empirical analysis included the Brazilian market risk premium assessment 
over the eight-year period between 2008 and 2016 and the sub-periods, the pre-crisis and the 
crisis. The risk premium was positive before the crisis, although without statistical relevance 
as shown in Table 1. However, during the crisis, the excess market return was negative by a 
significant margin, with an average of -3% per month, comparable results with previous crisis, 
such as 2008-09 (Grouta & Zalewska, 2016). 
Observing the total period, we noticed that the monthly average risk premium was negative 
at an average of 0.3% per month, but not significantly different from 0. This estimated value 
was lower than the values found by Sanvicente (2017), Bortoluzzo (2016), and Mussa, Roger 
and Securato (2009), which were between 1% and 2% in their previous studies in Brazil. We 
attribute the difference to the severity of the financial crisis in 2014 to 2016 that was a result 
of the worst economic recession in the country since 1930. We tested the difference between 
the risk premium calculated during the crisis and in the pre-crisis periods and found that the 
means were significantly different, both through a two-sample t test and a Wilcoxon test, as the 
smaller sample normal distribution assumption was rejected. Figure 1 illustrates the estimates 
and the distribution. We noted a small increase in the variance of the risk premium during the 
crisis; however, through the F test, we rejected any significant differences in the variances. It is 
noteworthy that the standard deviation of 5.5 and a range of 26.4 for monthly returns were rather 




Brazilian Risk Premium Analysis
Total period Pre-Crisis Crisis
2008-2016 2008-2014 2014-2016
Risk Premium Monthly Average -0.3 0.4 -3.1
SD 5.2 4.9 5.6
Min -12.2 -9.7 -12.2
Max 12.3 12.3 8.5
Range 24.5 22.0 20.7
t -0.5 0.6 -2.3
p-value 0.6 0.6 <.001
Figure 1. 2008-2016 Brazilian Market Risk Premium: Monthly Mean and Volatility.
In the second stage of this study, we constructed the SOE portfolio and compared its performance 
with the market portfolio, as measured by the IBX index, and the risk-free rate. Considering 
the entire period, the SOE portfolio underperformed the market portfolio by an average of 
0.7% annually. The severity of the crisis negatively impacted the stock market but ,more so, 
the state-owned entities, which underperformed as a result of less efficiency in adapting to the 
new scenario, which required costs and investment reductions, and workforce layoffs. The SOE 
portfolio also underperformed the privatized portfolio, even though both portfolios contained 
similar sector allocation. The variance in the privatized portfolio was also much lower compared 
with the market portfolio, reflecting management’s ability to cope with the economic crisis.
In a study of performance differences between state-owned and private firms, Lazzarini and 
Musacchio (2018) found that the major difference in their returns, measured mainly by return on 
assets (ROA), occured in negative environments. The results indicated that political intervention 
caused the SOEs to deviate from their more normal course of action, as governments were more 





Table 2 summarizes the performance comparison of the two portfolios, while Figure 2 illustrates 
the difference in the monthly results and the volatility. The high volatility in both the market 
portfolio and the SOE portfolio shows no compensation in the form of excess returns during 
the period. 
Figure 2. Portfolios’ Monthly Returns.
Table 2 
Portfolio Return Analysis
Total Return Annualized Return SD Monthly Return Monthly Range (Max-Min)
Market Portfolio 
(IBX) 45% 5.2% 5.2 24.4
SOE Portfolio 38% 4.5% 6.8 34.4
Privatized Portfolio 48% 5.5% 4.7 20.3
Risk Free Rate 107% 10.4% 0.2 0.7
17
498
In the third stage, we calculated the excess return on the SOE portfolio and ran OLS regressions 
on the market excess return to estimate the portfolio beta during the 2009 to 2016 period. Three 
models were estimated, pre-crisis, crisis, and for the total period, with the crisis period determined 
as described in the methodology. The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 
Summary Statistics of OLS Regression of SOE Portfolio on the Market Portfolio
Total period Pre-Crisis During Crisis
2009-2018 2009-2014 2014-2016
α 0.1 0.5 0.2
t 0.3 1.5 0.2
p-value 0.82 0.14 0.85
β 1.16 0.98 1.62
t 17.7 14.0 12.8
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
R2 0.78 0.74 0.91
N 88 70 18
As expected, our research showed that the SOE portfolio presented a beta of 1.16 during 
the total period. As previous studies have shown, state-owned companies are less profitable, 
less efficient, with higher leverage, and less investment than before privatization (Megginson, 
Nash, & Randenborgh, 1994). A high beta can express the higher risk of a portfolio of less 
profitable, highly leveraged companies that are more susceptible to cyclical exposure. As Lima 
and Sanvicente (2013) demonstrated, investors recognize higher risk in low governance and less 
efficient companies and, therefore, require higher returns on these investments, which can be 
reflected in higher beta. 
However, after breaking the analysis into distinct periods, we observed that a high beta was not 
present during the entire period. By examining the sub-periods, as shown in Table 3, we noticed 
that the pre-crisis beta was closer to 1 versus a beta of 1.6 during the crisis period. It appears that 
during an economic upturn, state-controlled companies are able to present adequate growth and 
the market perception of risk does not differ from the market portfolio. In addition, the recent 
study by Boubakri et al. (2018) using a sample of Asian companies found that state-owned firms 
may enjoy a higher market valuation relative to non-government-owned firms when ownership is 
less than 50%. The reasons for this positive valuation by the market include financing decisions 
and the discount rate applied by investors. Further, a period of sound economic growth could 
mask the ownership risks and induce investors to over value SOEs. 
In the presence of a negative market premium, Pettengill (1995) showed that, as expected, 
high beta portfolios incur lower returns during down markets than low beta portfolios, providing 
further corroborative evidence of the expected association between beta and portfolio returns. 
However, the SOE portfolio behavior changed over time with a time-varying beta in addition to 
a significant change in market risk. Investors may have chosen to allocate resources in a portfolio 
of companies with an average beta close to 1 for a market risk premium of 0.4%, as in the pre-
crisis period, with the actual result in the following period a much higher risk premium of 1.6 




Marsh and Pfleiderer (2013) also exposed the increase in the volatility in asset returns as asset 
prices dropped sharply during the 2008 financial crisis as market factors increased in relative 
importance. It appears that the natural response to a crisis, at least for many investors, is to “flee 
to safety,” as confidence in the market erodes and prospects dim. The significant increase in 
state-owned company volatility during 2014 to 2016 appears to reflect the view of the SOE as 
a riskier asset that needs to be sold during a time of higher uncertainty, which is not captured 
by beta during the normal market, as in the pre-crisis period.
The observed structural change in the sub-period regression was also tested with the Chow 
test, confirming the existence of differences in the model before the crisis and after during 
the recovery period. With a 5% level of significance, we rejected the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient was stable. 
The parallel analysis of a privatized portfolio also confirmed our conclusions. As shown in Table 4, 
the privatized portfolio had a lower risk, represented by its beta of less than 1. Although the risk 
increased during the crisis as well, the increase was less pronounced, and beta was still below 1. 
Table 4 
Summary Statistics of OLS Regression of Privatized Portfolio on the Market Portfolio
Total period Pre-Crisis During Crisis
2009-2018 2009-2014 2014-2016
α -0.1 -0.2 0.1
t -0.2 -0.9 0.2
p-value 0.84 0.44 0.86
β 0.79 0.72 0.91
t 15.5 13.9 6.9
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
R2 0.73 0.73 0.74
N 88 70 18
Last, we tested the three-factor model for the SOE portfolio and found that the added variables 
did not help explain portfolio performance having statistics that were not significant at the 5% 
level. Results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 
Summary Statistics of OLS Regression of SOE on the three-factor model
α Market factor HML factor SMB factor
Coefficient 0.15 1.16 0.12 -0.06
t 0.4 16.9 1.2 -0.9
p-value 0.7 <.001 0.2 0.4
R2 0.78
N 88
R-squared was high for all models, but highest for the single-factor model during the crisis 
sub-period, accounting for more than 91%, indicating that the market risk premium could be 
the most important single factor explaining SOE performance during the period of financial 
distress. The lower beta and somewhat lower R squared in the pre-crisis period indicated that 
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other factors may explain the result of the SOE portfolio in this period. Our research suggests 
an ownership factor should be studied further to add to the market risk factor and help value 
SOEs in any stage of an economic cycle.
5. CONCLUSION
Our study analyzed exposure to market risk using the single-factor asset-pricing model for a 
Brazilian portfolio of SOEs in the period 2009 to 2016. Time series regressions were analyzed 
for the entire period and sub-periods, emphasizing the 2014 to 2016 economic recession. The 
empirical findings suggest that the SOE portfolio does not show a stable beta over time. In 
fact, despite a beta close to 1 during the expansion of the economic cycle, during the market 
turbulence caused by the recession, the portfolio risk increased by almost 70%, which resulted in 
significant negative returns below the market portfolio. The study found that the structural change 
in the CAPM and the increased risk during a period of crisis could be attributable to investor 
expectations that state-owned companies would be unable to adapt as quickly as their private 
counterparts during an economic downturn, as investors’ confidence significantly diminished 
during this timeframe. The Fama-French three-factor model did not help explain the differences 
in performance. As other studies on privatizations have shown (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001), 
that state-owned companies are significantly less profitable as a result of lower efficiencies, usually 
from more employees, considering their political use, differences which can increase during a 
recession period. By contrast, Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2017) showed that, during times of 
crisis, well-managed and highly efficient companies with stronger corporate governance and 
greater social responsibility can retain investor trust and weather the crisis with lower volatility, 
as demonstrated in the privatized portfolio.
Performance differences between private companies and SOEs were larger during the crisis. 
The implication is that private companies are more flexible and can adjust and cut costs, such 
as through layoffs, while SOEs are pressured to retain employees and investments at all times. 
This happens when SOEs are controlled by the state and not when the state is only a minority 
shareholder. When the state is constrained, SOEs are managed like private firms.
Our analysis offers important implications for investors and portfolio managers, whose 
main objective is to develop efficient portfolios with greater expected return for a given class 
of quantifiable beta risk. In this sense, the results implicate that SOE are riskier than privately 
owned enterprises during moments of high volatility, which is not expressed in the CAPM beta 
during the pre-crisis period, with privatized portfolios presenting lower risk in both scenarios.
The empirical results also indicate a further research agenda, related to the fact that there 
may be other factors influencing the performance of the SOE portfolio that we did not capture 
in the CAPM or in the Fama-French model. In this sense, it can be investigated if a fraction of 
the risk not explained in these models may have arisen from the fact that the SOEs’ managers 
were not well equipped to handle financial crises. Further analysis could test for other factors 
such as a specific ownership factor that influences the performance of a state-owned company 
during a financial crisis compared with a privately owned one, may be a path for future research 
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SOE Portfolio description by ticker and company name 
Stock Ticker Company Name
PETR4 Petróleo Brasileiro -Petrobrás
BBAS3 Banco do Brasil
BBSE3 BB Seguridade Participações
ELET6 Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras - Eletrobrás
SBSP3 Cia de Saneamento Básico do Estado de São Paulo
CMIG4 Cia Energética de Minas Gerais - Cemig
BRSR6 Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul
CASN4 Cia Catarinense de Agua e Saneamento
CPLE6 Cia Paranaense de Energia - Copel
CSMG3 Cia de Saneamento de Minas Gerais
CESP6 Cia Energética de São Paulo
SAPR4 Cia de Saneamento do Paraná
LIGT3 Light
BNBR3 Banco do Nordeste
CLSC4 Centrais Elétricas de Santa Catarina
BEES4 Banco do Estado do Espirito Santo - Banestes
BSLI4 Banco de Brasília
BAZA3 Banco da Amazônia
EMAE4 Empresa Metropolitana de Aguas e Energia
BGIP4 Banco do Estado de Sergipe
CEBR6 Cia Energética de Brasília
CEED4 Cia Estadual de Distribuição de Energia





Privatized Portfolio description by ticker and company name
Stock Ticker Company Name









CSNA3 Cia Siderúrgica Nacional
ENGI11 Energisa
USIM5 Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais
EQTL3 Equatorial Energia AS
TRPL4 Cia de Transmissão de Energia Elétrica Paulista
ENBR3 Energias do Brasil
TAEE11 Transmissora Aliança de Energia Elétrica
CGAS5 Cia de Gás de São Paulo
ELPL3 Eletropaulo Metropolitana Eletricidade de São Paulo
OIBR4 Oi
ECOR3 Ecorodovias Infraestrutura e Logística
TIET11 Aes Tiete Energia
STBP11 Santos Brasil Participação
